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“It will be like having a horse. People have horses, which is cool. There will be people 
who have non-autonomous cars, like people have horses. It would just be unusual to use 
that as a mode of transport.” 
        – Elon Musk, Tesla CEO5 
 
Abstract 
We discuss the pros of adopting government-issued digital currencies as 
well as a supranational digital iCurrency.  One such pro is to get rid of 
paper money (and coinage), a ubiquitous medium for spreading 
germs, as highlighted by the recent coronavirus outbreak.  We set 
forth three policy recommendations for adapting mobile devices 
as new digital wallets, regulatory oversight of sovereign digital 
currencies and user data protection, and a supranational digital 
iCurrency for facilitating international digital monetary linkages.     
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 Money is dirty.  Literally.  Surfaces of banknotes can be laden with harmful bacteria such 
as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, E. coli, Pseudonomnas aeruoginosa, bacillus 
cereus, influenza viruses, yeast, fungi, human excreta, mold, and even cocaine and heroin.6  The 
recent coronavirus outbreak (the infectious disease COVID-19 caused by the virus SARS-CoV-2 
[CDC, 2020]), that originated in Wuhan, China, has put a new emphasis on disease transmission 
through paper money.  People’s Bank of China announced mid February 2020 its new 
measures, to wit, disinfecting and destroying cash to help reduce the spread of the coronavirus 
[Yeung, 2020].  This begs the question: Does the latest coronavirus outbreak make yet another 
case for digital money? 
 In this age of 5G internet and so many aspects of our lives gone digital and mobile, 
paper money (not to mention coins) seems archaic, if not barbaric.  At the 2017 National 
Governors Association Summer Meeting, Tesla CEO Elon Musk compared driving a non-
autonomous car in 2037 to riding a horse [Galeon, 2017].  Unlike autonomous cars, switching to 
purely digital money is not associated with direct human safety concerns.  Quite the contrary, 
ridding the society of paper money (and coinage) would get rid of a ubiquitous medium for 
spreading germs.  So, what are we – the society – waiting for? 
 There is no technological obstacle to adopting digital money – only political and 
regulatory adjustments are required.  Carrying cash in a physical wallet is not any safer than 
“carrying” digital currency on a mobile device.  Yes, a mobile device can be lost or stolen, but so 
can be a physical wallet.  When the latter occurs, credit and debit cards can be misused in a 
fraudulent manner all the same; however, the issuers have some safeguards for that.  The loss 
of cash is limited to the amount in the wallet, but unlike a credit or debit card issuer, the 
Federal Reserve (or, more generally, a central bank) or the Treasury cannot protect the carrier 
of cash against such “fraudulent use” (that is, theft); nor is the carrier protected against 
pathogens such as the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, possibly lurking on the banknote surfaces.  And 
there is no reason why risks cannot be mitigated in digital wallets by setting certain limits, akin 
to carrying a fixed amount of cash in one’s physical wallet – with the added bonus that the 
carrier of digital cash never has to touch anything laden with pathogens.   
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 Indeed, unlike exchanging cash, exchanging digital money requires no physical contact 
whatsoever, be it peer-to-peer, customer-to-vendor, etc.  Everything can be done via scans and 
other touchless technologies (e.g., when paying for coffee).  Even getting cash from an ATM – 
another archaic device – requires touching surfaces such as touch-screens and/or keypads.  This 
too spreads germs without adding any tangible value to anyone.  The World Health 
Organization is already encouraging using contactless payment technologies where possible as  
banknotes may be spreading the coronavirus [Gardner, 2020], [Huang, 2020].  So, here is our 
 Policy Recommendation No. 1:  Adapt the framework of a mobile device (such as a 
mobile phone) as the new digital wallet with simple and easy-to-follow rules that encourage 
peer-to-peer, customer-to-vendor and other digital transactions involving mobile devices.
7
  
 Digital money with touchless mobile payments is the future, just as autonomous 
vehicles.  ATMs and physical cash are the past, just as horses.  However, unlike Elon Musk’s 
aforesaid autonomous vehicle vs. horse analogy, in the future there will be no physical cash.  All 
money will be digital as from a practical viewpoint there is no reason for a hybrid system.  
Consider this.  Unless one has nefarious motives such as money laundering, tax evasion, illicit 
drug trade and other illegal activities [Rogoff, 2016], there is no compelling reason to cling to 
cash.  Yes, government-issued purely digital money (see below) will give more control to the 
government.  However, freedom cannot be unlimited – we do not live in an anarchy.  Certain 
freedoms must be sacrificed for the greater good.  And if ridding the society of physical cash 
can save lives, depriving all kinds of shady characters of their ability to use cash for illegal 
purposes is a small price to pay.8  Does anyone really believe that, say, 100 years from now we 
will still have paper money?  And, per Elon Musk, if autonomous vehicles are the norm in 20 
years from now, then it is difficult to believe that purely digital money will not be. 
 One may argue that cash – especially in smaller denominations – is still useful for 
making anonymous (e.g., “vice-related”, but otherwise innocuous) purchases (see, e.g., 
[Solomon, 2017]).  Indeed, the populace’s liberal freedoms should not suffer unnecessarily.  
However, one can imagine various simple solutions, such as small-denomination digital gift 
cards without the bearer’s identity.  Such an anonymous gift card will have to be purchased 
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through a regular digital wallet and can be argued to still be traceable.  However, so are cash 
withdrawals from ATMs.  Sweden will be cashless by 2023 [Finextra, 2019], but not vice-free.  
 To be clear, by digital money we do not mean Bitcoin [Nakamoto, 2008] and other 
decentralized cryptocurrencies, or Libra-like [The Libra Association, 2019]9 cryptocurrencies 
issued by a consortium of private (including for-profit) entities.  Instead, we mean digital money 
issued by sovereign governments (see, e.g., [Kakushadze and Liew, 2018] and references 
therein), and a universal digital iCurrency proposed in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015, 2018] (also 
see [Kakushadze and Yu, 2019]) issued by a broad consortium of sovereign governments.  Thus, 
realistically, mass-adoption of digital money is difficult to imagine without it being issued by a 
government (or a governmental agency) and having an appropriate regulatory oversight (in the 
case of national digital currencies such as the rumored-soon-to-be-forthcoming “digital Yuan” 
of China),10 or by a broad consortium of governments for supranational adoption [Kakushadze 
and Liew, 2018], [Kakushadze and Yu, 2019].  One glaring advantage of government-issued vs. 
decentralized digital currencies is no need for energy-wasteful mining11 (as in, e.g., Bitcoin).12 
 The necessity for a regulatory oversight appears to be a foregone conclusion (see, e.g., 
[USHCFS, 2019]); however, some basic protections must be put in place, which brings us to our  
 Policy Recommendation No. 2:  A sovereign digital currency must be regulated by 
governmental agencies with all transactions recorded and monitored to identify nefarious 
actors and prevent fraudulent activities.  However, the golden rule is that this data cannot be 
sold (including to commercial entities), or used for political gain.
13
 
 Digital money would therefore seem a win-win, but there are forces out there resistant 
to change.14  So, other than nefarious actors, who stands to lose most from doing away with the 
status quo and adopting digital currency?  Table 2 in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2018] summarizes 
pros and cons to some stakeholders from government-issued digital currencies.  Here let us 
mention two of the stakeholders that would be adversely affected by digital money. 
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 First, we have commercial banks, whose existing business model is jeopardized by digital 
money, most notably due to lower fees.  Second, we have central banks and governments, 
which in many instances perceive digital currency as a threat to the existing monetary system 
(including through its cannibalization).  However, there is a flipside to this too: the issuer-
governments stand to gain, not lose, control as – unlike with paper money – with digital money 
all transactions are recorded and the information is readily available to the authorities; albeit 
this information should only be used to prevent nefarious activities.15  In this regard, the U.S. is 
the sovereign state with most to lose in the process of the inevitably forthcoming avalanche of 
government-issued digital currencies, with a clear policy implication: adapt to the changing 
reality, issue the digital dollar sooner rather than later, or risk being marginalized [Kakushadze 
and Liew, 2018] – including by China (see, e.g., [Horsley, 2020]) and other players.16    
 It is difficult to imagine mass adoption of digital currencies unless they are issued by 
governments (or governmental agencies) with streamlined rules and regulations.  What would 
be truly remarkable in this regard is a supranational digital currency, which was termed 
iCurrency in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015], backed by a broad consortium of sovereign 
governments [Kakushadze and Liew, 2018], [Kakushadze and Yu, 2019].  iCurrency would allow 
more precise estimation of global inflation, global output, global productivity, global labor 
gains, and other global macroeconomic indicators, as well as GDP (gross domestic product) for 
various countries and regions and globally.  (GDP measured using iCurrency was termed iGDP in 
[Kakushadze and Liew, 2015].)  With low sovereign government intervention (which requires a 
democratic protocol for the issuing consortium of sovereign governments) and low fees for 
global transactions, iCurrency should be a boon to our global economy.  Perhaps somewhat 
ironically, government-issued digital currencies may be a step forward (not backward) in this 
regard, depending on how the world leaders approach this issue.  This brings us to our  
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 Policy Recommendation No. 3:  Digital monetary linkages across countries would be 
facilitated by a supranational digital iCurrency issued by a consortium of sovereign 
governments.  The iCurrency transaction data would be accessible to the appropriate 
governmental agencies of the consortium member countries subject to the limitations set forth 
in our Policy Recommendation No. 2 above.
17
   
 Quoting from [Kakushadze and Liew, 2015]: “If mankind is destined to make it to Mars 
(and beyond) and establish extraterrestrial colonies in our solar system, a universal currency 
devoid of government control and other forms of manipulation would appear to be a necessity, 
rather than wishful thinking.”  So, ridding our monetary system of paper money indeed appears 
to be a win-win: among many other things, not only would it be good for our global economy, 
but it would also get rid of a ubiquitous medium for spreading germs and help save lives, so we 
would have one fewer worry in times of crises such as the latest coronavirus outbreak.  
 Finally, let us address the elephant in the room as it relates to iCurrency, which is the 
U.S. – the hegemon in the current International Monetary System.  Why would/should the U.S. 
want iCurrency?  Actually, there are two somewhat separate issues here: i) the U.S.’s leverage 
in dealing with its adversaries; and ii) the U.S. dollar being the dominant reserve currency. 
 Thus, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, S.W.I.F.T. 
SCRL), the leading worldwide network for cross-border payments, is a cooperative society 
operating under the Belgian law and is owned by its member financial institutions.  However, 
the U.S. is still able to get its way by, e.g., levying sanctions on SWIFT if the latter does not 
cooperate (see, e.g., [Gladstone, 2012]).  In this regard, if there is a supranational iCurrency and 
SWIFT is replaced by another network for cross-border payments in iCurrency, the U.S.’s 
leverage will not be diminished as it can levy sanctions all the same.18  The U.S.’s leverage does 
not lie in it directly controlling SWIFT (which it does not), or that the U.S. dollar is the dominant 
reserve currency.  Instead, it stems from the U.S. being the largest and most stable economy, 
and most wish to avoid their U.S. assets frozen, travel restricted, or being otherwise sanctioned. 
                                                           
17
 As mentioned above, what we are proposing here is not adopting decentralized or Libra-like cryptocurrencies as 
national digital currencies or a supranational iCurrency, but government-issued and appropriately regulated  
sovereign digital currencies and a supranational digital iCurrency issued by a broad consortium of governments.  
However, regulatory sentiments around the world for cryptocurrencies are still instructive; see, e.g., [GLRC, 2018].   
18
 E.g., if, hypothetically, Ripple started processing payments for Iran, it would invariably draw the U.S.’s ire.  
7 
 
 In fact, if the transaction data for a supranational iCurrency is accessible to the member 
states (as set forth in our Policy Recommendation No. 3 above), the U.S. stands to gain, not 
lose, as it will have an (essentially) unfettered access to all iCurrency transaction data, globally. 
 Now, what about iCurrency replacing the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency?  
After all, the U.S. enjoys the “exorbitant privilege”,19 which, for our purposes here (and 
following [Gourinchas and Rey, 2007]), refers to the excess return of the U.S. external assets on 
the U.S. external liabilities.  Thus, according to [Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot, 2017], this excess 
return was about 2.6%/yr during 1952, Q1 to 1972, Q4, and 2.4%/yr from 1973, Q1 to 2016, Q1.  
However, this exorbitant privilege also has a flipside: the “exorbitant duty”.20  In a nutshell, the 
U.S. provides insurance to the rest of the world (ROW) in exchange for having the (exorbitant) 
privilege of paying low interest rates on its safe dollar-denominated assets.  So, the exorbitant 
privilege is not a free lunch but an insurance (risk) premium.  In times of global crisis, the U.S. 
dollar appreciates (owing to a flight to safety), which results in a massive wealth transfer from 
the U.S. to the ROW.21  Superfluously this may appear innocuous as on average the exorbitant 
privilege translates into a positive return.  However, the U.S. debt increases in the process as 
the valuations of the U.S. Treasuries do not collapse [Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot, 2017].  
 Another aspect is the volatility.  The portfolio is not well-diversified: it is long the U.S. 
and short the ROW (or the other way around, depending on the trade).22  Unsurprisingly, in 
times of crisis the volatility goes through the roof.23  The ballooning U.S. debt does not help. 
 So, it is natural to wonder, is the exorbitant privilege really worth it?  Does the U.S. really 
want to bail out the ROW in times of crisis?  The status of the U.S. dollar as the dominant 
reserve currency also harms the competitiveness of the U.S. exports as its exchange rate is an 
estimated 5-10% higher than it would otherwise be [Dobbs et al, 2009].  Would it not make 
more sense to spread the burden during the global crises more evenly across the world as 
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opposed to shouldering it alone while the ROW gets bailed out – in fact, gets paid – for (in 
many cases) causing such crises in the first instance?  The latest coronavirus outbreak and the 
turmoil that it has caused the financial markets was certainly not caused by the U.S.  In this 
regard, iCurrency would be beneficial, not harmful, to the U.S.  The stability of iCurrency24 
would have to be maintained by the entire consortium, not by the U.S. alone.  This latest crisis 
caused by the coronavirus outbreak might be the high time for the U.S. to reevaluate its view 
on the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency, the exorbitant privilege and exorbitant 
duty and shift toward a less volatile and more sustainable (at least in terms of its ever-growing 
debt) regime where the ROW, many parts of which got extremely wealthy through wealth 
transfers from the U.S., will take its fair share of responsibility for the stability of our global 
economy.  And the U.S.’s hegemony does not hinge on the U.S. dollar being the dominant 
reserve currency, but on its stable economy, legal system, science and technology, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, free speech, democracy, and many other things that make the U.S. what it is.  
 To summarize, a clear and transparent digital monetary system with a robust regulatory 
oversight to preclude bad actors from abusing it and user data protection in place would be a 
boon to our global economy.  Our policy recommendations above aim at achieving this goal. 
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